Some argue that the appearance of wage differentials reflects a temporary disequilibrium in a clearing (often called "competitive") labor market. Generally two groups of workers self-select their place of employment according to differences in sectoral nonpecuniary benefits, costs of entry, personal human capital, or ability. In the popular Roy model, supply-side factors dominate job sorting. 4 Wages are flexible, and earnings gaps of workers operating under different contracts reflect productivity differences or compensating differentials. Market equilibration and ability-based income differentials occur over time.
This case study uses data from a household survey to determine which type of labor market is emerging in the Honduran nontraditional export region. The article contributes to the literature by linking explanations of hypothesized segmentation to its empirical verification under a variety of statistical and econometric techniques. For compatibility with other studies, the article uses a tier division of informal-and formalsector jobs and contracts. In addition, the article highlights the often ignored influence of family ties and social capital in second-best labor markets.
Section II deals with the employment potential of nontraditional exports such as farm-raised shrimp. It reviews selected contractual arrangements to provide theoretical predictions about how the labor market will behave. In Section III the understanding of clearing and nonclearing labor markets in the rural setting is formalized by introducing an endogenous simultaneous switching system. In Section IV I use a crosssectional data set on earnings and employment to test the econometric model. The results support the notion of a weakly segmented labor market equilibrium, yet they suggest that the source of segmentation along family lines differs from that discussed in the standard literature. Also, the implications for rural income distribution are discussed. Section V concludes.
II. Research Setting and Industry Employment Trends
Farm-raised shrimp production, like other aquaculture enterprises, is one of the fastest-growing industries worldwide. Mariculture involves the transformation of raw larva seed into edible shrimp through stocking and feeding in pond grow-out systems. Industrial production of shrimp began in the southern zone of Honduras in 1985. The southern zone has traditionally been one of the country's poorest areas, with high population densities and declining environmental resources. The previous expansion of cotton, sugar, and cattle farms in the zone resulted in extensive deforestation and population displacement." Poor soils and cycles of drought and flooding have resulted in particularly bad harvests of basic grains and out-migration.
It is hoped that the new nontraditional agricultural exports, such as shrimp and melon, will solve the twin goals of foreign-exchange generation and regional development. Under Decree 968 of 1980 and Agreement 229 of 1991, the Ministry of Tourism (SECTUR) and the General Directorate of Fishing (DIGPESCA) were mandated to transfer coastal land-use rights to exporters. By 1993 more than 31,000 hectares in southern Honduras had passed from communal gathering use to export development, and some 80 farms operated 11,500 hectares of ponds.6 These enclosure and land access changes may have negative employment effects, since they reduce the opportunities for self-employment by coastal households and increase the market supply of labor, resulting in downward pressure on existing wage rates. However, new jobs created by the mariculture industry and associated firms increase the market demand for labor, so the final effect on village wage levels remains unclear. The type of mariculture technology implemented (extensive or semiintensive) and farm size also affect the final labor demands. Most mariculture studies have focused on one aspect of the labor market-the number of jobs created-and present wide discrepancies. The most commonly cited figure is 12,000 families employed by the Honduran shrimp industry.' Casual labor contracts dominate the local market, and to date about 30% of the shrimp jobs are permanent, and 50% of the positions are direct hire. In general, the industry exhibits a decreasing intensity of labor use with size, so that the big farms create fewer jobs per land unit than the smaller ones. 8 Specific labor contracts for different tasks in mariculture reflect the technology and social setting in which production occurs. The agency problem around effort extraction represents the largest worker management problem in many natural resource industries, such as mariculture. The unsupervisable task of larva gathering for shrimp seed to stock the ponds (the task requiring the largest number of people in the region) is a case in point. Firms acquire synthetic seed from international hatcheries or wild seed from local contractors who manage the gatherers' labor. A gatherer's product is influenced by his or her effort and by the total larvae available, which is a function of stochastic variables such as water temperature, salinity, and the lunar cycle. In effect, the fruits of the gatherer's work or shirking cannot clearly be separated from the impact of the stochastic natural environment, so a classic moral hazard problem emerges.
Labor contractors use two types of incentive-compatible contracts-tournaments and piece rates-to solve the moral hazard problem. In some areas the contracts exist side by side, which suggests that workers could be compensated under either arrangement. The use of these two types of contracts also makes it possible to control for concerns about occupational-specific compensating differentials across jobs in the lower and upper tiers as an alternative explanation to segmentation. Piece-rate contracts are common in gathering and fishing settings.9 These daily contracts may be viewed as a form of egalitarian rationing in which all who desire can work. The slice of the total possible employment is "rationed" into smaller pieces in a nondiscriminatory manner. But returns (the average piece rate) may be scaled down as the number of entrants increases or the natural environment changes, so that wage rates are flexible. Piece-rate gathering arrangements resemble other temporary rural labor contracts in cattle tending, sugarcane cutting, and land clearing, and these occupations are grouped along with other temporary work into a "lower tier" of the labor market.
Access to the more unusual tournament contracts, however, represents the type of nonegalitarian rationing common in the efficiency wage and labor market segmentation literature. Contractors choose their permanent gatherers very carefully, and job retention is a function of both player effort and luck. In the tournament payment system, shrimp farm technicians and labor contractors rank gatherers on the basis of performance; winners are retained for the next period and paid a salary with bonus, and losers are not invited back to work and thus are fired. Tournament players remaining with a labor contractor for several months enter into an interlinked labor-consumption contract with additional benefits not unlike those offered to full-time formal-sector workers covered by national labor laws. These occupations may be grouped together into an "upper tier" of the labor market.
These institutional features of the labor market suggest that a distinct schism is emerging between the formal and informal sectors and that efficiency wage concerns may offer a plausible explanation for earnings differentials and segmentation. Higher wages should be associated with upper-tier workers undertaking unsupervisable tasks, and both fixed payments and returns to human capital may be higher in this tier of the labor market. However, other hiring and signaling mechanisms may reduce the need to pay efficiency wages. Reliance on kin networks is increasingly cited in the literature as an alternative mechanism for ensuring worker productivity.1" Hiring along family lines is a fishing industry tradition.
Other demand-side explanations for segmentation, as suggested by Funkhouser, might be relevant in the Honduran case." Mariculture firms could be paying the most experienced, trained farm employees higher wages to reduce turnover costs. Likewise, larva seed contractors may want to reduce the turnover of experienced gatherers who have acquired significant fishing knowledge. A minimum-wage explanation of segmentation is less compelling, as the Honduran labor code pertains only to direct-hire permanent shrimp farm employees who have worked more than 3 months. In 1993 shrimp farms were legally required to pay (permanent) laborers L 17.50-L 21.00 (L = lempiras; $2.50-$3.00) daily. Yet this minimum is not a relevant price floor, since the observed sample mean and employer offer are higher.
As yet no unions exist in the nontraditional agricultural export sector. Substitute management-sponsored solidarity associations operate on the large shrimp farms. These organizations provide economic benefits, such as discount shops and savings clubs, to permanent workers to enhance their loyalty and, indirectly, their effort for the firm in a "pseudoefficiency-wage" arrangement. Indeed, the use of solidarity associations could lend support to a more radical interpretation of segmentation as a means to divide an angry rural population affected by enclosure. Under this scenario, higher earnings differentials between the upper and lower tier in the most enclosed village are expected. Additional supply-side causes of segmentation are explored below, and the relevance of each of these segmentation variants is sorted out by analyzing the results of an endogenous simultaneous switching model.
III. An Econometric Model to Explore Segmentation
Several statistical techniques commonly are used to verify the segmentation suggested by theory. The econometric challenge is to provide consistent estimates of sectoral earnings equations and, if possible, to control for relevant economic factors such as human capital, latent ability, and costs of entry. In this article I undertake these estimates and then test for labor market segmentation through the use of methods developed in extensions of the Roy model. 12 In statistical terms, the first criterion for segmentation is the existence of distinct wage payment equations across tiers, with higher rewards to human capital in the upper tier. Two separate earnings functions should fit the data better than a pooled function. Selectivity corrections of the earnings functions often are necessary, since self-selection may be based on a worker's latent and visible characteristics.
In the simplest model, tier groups are mutually exclusive so that a dichotomous, univariate probit selection function is appropriate.13 Total sample observations on earnings are split into an "s" and an "n" subgroup by whether a worker is ever observed in the upper tier (M = 1). The latent choice rule is Table 1 defines the relevant survey variables used in both the selec- Recall that the first criterion of the dual labor market theory is the existence of two separate earnings equations with significantly higher returns to human capital in the upper tier. Although returns to literacy are higher in the lower tier, the other human capital variables of fishing experience and age have larger upper-tier coefficients, and the differential on the fishing experience dummy is highly significant. In addition, the returns to landholdings are quite different across the tiers. Use of each additional land unit reduced lower-tier earnings by 9.4%, yet increased upper-tier earnings. Thus, differential access to technology and other inputs also contributes to the earnings differentials across tiers.
Despite the significant difference in several of the individual earnings coefficients, results of a Chow test suggest that one equation fits the data better than two separate earnings trends.23 The null hypothesis of at least a weakly competitive market cannot be rejected; however, this does not necessarily mean the segmentation hypothesis is rejected. 24 Following equation (7), it appears that workers would choose to work in the upper tier if they could. Using the average value of the explanatory variables under the different payment structures, I found that upper-tier workers earn about 1% more than they would have in the lower tier, but the differential for lower-tier-type workers was 18%. Using the actual background characteristics of the 145 observations in the data set, 55% would receive higher expected earnings in the upper tier. Although these percentages are not as high as those reported in other studies,25 they provide some support for the second criterion of segmentation. Tables 5 and 6 The existence of rationing in the labor market is the second criterion to be tested. Table 5 shows that the key factors that affect entry into the upper tier-kinship ties and village residency-do not enhance earnings. This supports a rationing hypothesis in that the higher probability of tier entry for workers possessing these traits is not due to higher anticipated relative earnings. Rationing appears to be occurring due to noneconomic background characteristics.
The FIML estimates of table 5 also allow the imposition of the cross-equation restrictions of equation (8) implied by the nonrationing hypothesis. Table 6 reports the likelihood-ratio test statistics calculated from the two regression specifications.28 Turning to the first specification, the likelihood-ratio test easily rejects the competitive market restriction when all variables common to the sorting and earnings equations are considered.29 Thus, the labor market appears segmented in that factors rationing entry into the better tier are not matched by an adequate compensating differential across tiers.
A first subgroup of endowment variables appears slightly more important in explaining this trend. In particular, place of residence affects rationing of entry into the better jobs (the test statistic is 28.16, compared  with the critical level of 3.84) . But rather than support a segmentation argument, this type of cross-village differentiation is consistent with other problems in the labor market. The few high-paying positions are located in village A and village C mariculture operations, and residents of village B face effective barriers to entry to these jobs. Because of distance, transportation limitations, and farm managers' preferences for hiring near the farm, little employment mobility across villages was observed during the study period. The other important endowment variables-kin relations and landholdings-are highly significant in contributing to segmentation.
The second specification with the village variables excluded shows even stronger evidence of segmentation. The likelihood-ratio test statistic strongly rejects equation (8) Sorting by experience, preference, or landholdings is consistent with a weakly competitive market associated with self-selection, but sorting by kinship is not. As noted above, employers may use family ties to achieve efficiency gains in unsupervisable settings or as a substitute signaling device of worker quality. Yet, since the kin variable is insignificant at the earnings stage, these family ties do not provide productivity gains and earnings benefits to the workers. This suggests that segmentation along kinship lines could be serving another purpose-that of securing worker loyalty in a conflictive production setting or even safeguarding an employer's production assets. But, since kinship ties are endowed rather than invested in by workers, kinship is not a perfect substitute for human capital, and workers who lack kinship ties simply may be excluded from new opportunities arising in the export sector.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this article I suggest that to assess the development potential of new export products it is first necessary to understand how rural labor markets operate. Despite projected increases in labor demands, whether the labor market clears or not in equilibrium remains a primary concern. The article draws on various strands of the literature which suggest that in a setting of conflictive land-use changes and a second-best economic envi-ronment, a nonclearing, segmented labor market may be expected because of efficiency wage, worker recruitment, or social control concerns. One of the objectives of the article is to assess whether the labor market operates as described above or in a more competitive manner characterized by worker self-selection.
The econometric tests from the Honduran case study demonstrate weak labor market segmentation, most likely for reasons associated with employers' needs to pay efficiency wages and to acquire some loyalty from residents in the areas most affected by land enclosures. The descriptive statistics show a sorting of fishermen into more flexible positions and of educated workers into the upper tier, providing some evidence of worker self-selection. But other factors important in selectionincluding kinship and village residency-bring few earnings benefits.
The regression results of two specifications do not change greatly across the OLS and FIML techniques. There are higher returns to some of the human capital variables in the upper tier, which demonstrates an important part of the segmentation theory. I also determined that in many cases a worker whose observed characteristics are identical to those of another earns more merely by being in the upper tier. There were conflicting results across the estimates as to whether two-tier earnings equations represent the data better than equation (1). But extensions of the likelihood-ratio tests demonstrate some job rationing of the upper-tier positions, most likely along kinship and geographical lines. Also, definitive submarkets across villages were observed, most likely due to travel mobility barriers. However, the segmentation of the labor market by kinship ties remains problematic, since this form of social capital is not easily acquired.
The findings point to the emerging effects of mariculture and other natural-resource-based export expansions in developing countries. Areas with conflictive land-use changes, large-scale production operations, and worker-monitoring concerns may be more prone to subsequent income distribution problems. Finally, the econometric results, and the importance of kinship in particular, contrast much of the standard representation of developing country labor markets differentiated by education, race, class, and minimum-wage coverage.
Further research is needed into the nature of institutional innovations to deal with labor market imperfections in monitoring, recruitment, and loyalty. In addition, extension of the analysis to settings with widespread formal education coverage may more accurately reveal the differential returns and importance of social and human capital in rural economies. 19. The random stratified sample included households that rely primarily on labor incomes, rather than households that are heavily endowed with boats, land, cattle assets, and other forms of wealth. Village informants suggested a classification of wealth levels such that households owning more than five manzanas (0.7 hectares) of land, one boat, and five cattle were considered the wealth- 
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